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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
C. G. VERim, ELMER A" Wi.cox, WILLIAM G. HALE.
FRoM C. G. VERN.mp
BiGA-mI.
Draughn v. State. Old. 158 Pac. 890. Second marriage following a coln-
mon-law marriage.
A common-law marriage in this state is valid, and if a party to such a
marriage marries again, before the. same has been dissolved by death or legal
proceedings, he is guilty of bigamy.
CORPUS DEIIcTx.
White v. State. Ga. 89 S. E. 175. Intoxicating Liquor; Proof; "Hypoth-
esis." (From the syllabus by the Court.)
"The circumstances in proof sufficiently established the corpus delicti. The
utensils, with the accompanying paraphernalia, as well as the evidence of
mash and beer and smoke, added to the unmistakable odor of whisky which
had been spilled, taken in connection with the extreme seclusion of the spot,
which by its signs presented many indicia of having been selected as a sylvan
sanctuary of Bacchus, absolutely precludes the 'inference that so many cir-
cumstances of obvious import could have fortuitously occurred. Nor is it
reasonable to suppose that the presence of the still was due to chance or acci-
dent, while it was in transportation, since it was found away from any road,
and there is no evidence that such utensils are as yet transported by aero-
planes. When proof of the corpus delicti is dependent wholly upon circum-
stantial evidence, such evidence, of course, will be insufficient, if it suggests
a theory which is as consistent with the piesumption that no crime was in
fact committed as with the inference that some act was done which was a vio-
lation of the law; but a hypothesis of guilt which is planted upon occular
demonstration of certain signs, all of which point in the same direction, can-
not be supplanted by a hypothesis of innocence which would not be suggested
to ordinary intelligence, and which owes its existence entirely to a flight of
fancy. * * * The corpus delicti was in this case fully established."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
People v. Champion. Cal. 158 Pac. 501. Validity of Statute requiring par-
ent to support minor child. Punishment of a divorced husband, under Pen.
Code, sec. 270, denouncing the offense of willfully omitting to furnish food,
clothing, etc., to his minor children, is not violative of his constitutional right
to be exempt from imprisonment for debt in any civil action, under Const., art.
1, sec.% 15, though in defendant's divorce suit an order for the payment of
money by him to his wife, awarded custody of the children, for their support,
was made by defendant's consent upon a stipulation.
DISBARMENT. -
In re Hilton. Utah 158 Pac. 691. Improper conduct of attorney. Where
an attorney, delivering a funeral oration over the body of an executed mur-
derer, (Hillstrom), venomously attacked the Supreme Court which affirmed
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the conviction, accusing the court of being improperly influenced by a powerful
religious body in the state, charging the court with prejudice and unfairness
and garbling the accounts of the trial and of proceedings before the pardon
board, the attorney is guilty of professional misconduct which warrants his
disbarment under Comp. Laws 1907, secs. 113, 120, respectively declaring that
it is the duty of an attorney to support the Constitution and laws of the
United States, to maintain the respect due courts, and employ for the purpose
of maintaining causes confided to him only such means as are consistent with
the truth, and that an attorney may be disbarred for any violation of his
duties or for moral turpitude, for an attorney who so misrepresented the court,
attempting to bring the high judicial office into disrespect, is guilty of moral
turpitude.
EVIDENCE.
State v. Wiggins. N. C. 89 S. E. 58. Trailing by Bloodhounds. In a
prosecution for murder by lying in ambush, testimony of the trailing of de-
fendants by bloodhounds from a log behind which deceased said he had been
shot, was admissible where the testimony of the owner and trainer of the
dogs showed that they were of pure blood, of a stock characterized by acute-
ness of sense and power of discrimination, possessed of such qualifications,
and trained in their exercise of tracking human beings.
FoOD.
U. S. v. Forty Barrels of Coca Cola. 36 Sup. Ct Reptr. 573. Misbranding
-distinctive or descriptive name: Adulteration-"added Harmful Ingredient."
The name "Coca Cola" cannot be said as a matter of law to be distinctive
rather than descriptive of a compound with coca and cola ingredients, so as
to escape condemnation under the food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34
Stat. at L. 768, ch. 3915, Comp. Stat 1913, sec. 8717), sec. 8, as misbranded in
case of the absence of either coca or cola, on the theory that it was within
-the protection of the proviso in that section that an article of food shall not
be deemed to be misbranded in the case of "mixtures or compounds which
may be now or from time to time hereafter known as articles of food under
their own distinctive names," if the distinctive name of another article is
not used or imitated, and the name on the label or brand is accompanied with
a statement of the place of production.
A poisonous or deleterious ingredient called for as a constiiuent .by a
secret formula for a food product sold under its own distinctive name may
still be an added ingredient within the meaning of the provisions of'the
food and drugs act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 768, c. 3915, Comp. Stat
1913, sec. 8717), condemning as adulterated any article of food that contains
"any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient which may render
such article injurious to health," and the provisos in see. 8 that food mix-
tures or compounds "which may be now or from time to time hereafter known
as articles of food under their own distinctive names" are to enjoy the stated
immunity only in case they do "not contain any added poisonous or deleter-
ious ingredients," and that nothing in the act shall be construed to require
manufacturers of proprietary foods "which contain no unwholesome added
ingredient" to disclose their trade formulas except as the provisions of the
act may require to secure freedom from adulteration or misbranding.
INDICTMENT.
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State v. W!ingard. Wash. 158 Pac. 725. Omission of charging word. An
information charging tampering with witnesses subpoenaed to testify in jus-
tice's court which did not contain the charging verb "did," or its equivalent,
it being plain from the wording of the information that the word was omitted
by mistake, the fact being discoverable only by a careful perusal, was not de-
fective.
RAPE.
People v. Cavanaugh. Cal. 158 Pac. 1053. Force and Threats-submission
to officer. Submission by the prosecutrix merely because she believed the ac-
cused to be an officer, and that he would arrest her if she refused, is insuffi-
cient to make out the crime of rape.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
Brown v. State. Ga. 89 S. E. 342. Evidence wrongfully obtained. On the
trial of a criminal case, relevant incriminatory evidence which was taken
from the person of the accused by one who had illegally arrested him, and
which was discovered by a search of the person of the accused while he was
under such illegal arrest ,is admissible against him.
The admission against the accused of evidence so obtained does not
contravene the constitutional provision that "no person shall be compelled to
give testimony tending in any manner to criminate himself." Nor does it
violate the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.
TRIAL.
Brdcey v. Comnonwealth. Va. 89 S. E. 144. Right to Confront Witnesses.
Const. 1902, sec. 8, providing that "in all criminal prosecutions a man hath
the right to be, confronted with the accusers and witnesses," is not violated by
Byrd Law, Section 24 (Acts 1908, c. 189), providing that the certificate of the
state chemist showing an analysis of a mixture supposed to contain alcohol,
when signed and sworn to by him, "shall be evidence in all prosecutions under
the revenue laws."
Also held that the belief of one accused of selling ardent spirits without
a license as to the character of the beverage sold, or his intention to violate
the law, is not material in determining his guilt.
TRIAL.
State v. Cluff. Utah 158 Pac. 701. Improper Argument of Counsel. Laws
1915, c. 113, providing that a judgment shall not be reversed for error not
resulting in a miscarriage of justice, and that error shalt not be presumed to
have so resulted, but the court must be satisfied that it has that effect before
reversing% held not to abolish the presumption that error depriving the
accused of substantial rights is prejudicial.
TRIAL.
People v. Lawton. Colo. 158 Pac. 1099. Necessity of Arraignment and
Plea. Where a defendant is tried, convicted, and sentenced for a criminal
offense without arraignment and plea, the verdict on motion must be set aside
and a new trial granted. Garrigues and Scott, JJ., dissenting.
TRIAL.
State v. Smith. N. 3. 97 Atl. 780. Allegation and Proof. Where the in-
, dictment contains an averment of an illegal sale of liquors to persons unknown
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to the grand jury, it is improper on the trial to admit the evidence as to
sales made to them of persons who were subpoenaed to testify or testified be-
fore the grand jury, but are not named in the indictment. The judgment
must be revised, and the record remitted for a new trial, but the defendant
is not entitled to be discharged.
FRom WILLIAm G. HALE.
VERDICT.
People v. Edwards, 159 N. Y. Supp. 410. Grades of offenses.
An indictment against the defendant in two counts charged in the first
count the crime of rape in the first degree and in the second count an as-
sault with the intent to commit rape. Both counts were submitted to the jury,
who returned a general verdict of "guilty." The court imposed the sentence
provided for rape in the first degree. Held that "while the crimes charged
in the indictment were of different grades of crime, and the penalties provided
by the Penal Law were different in severity, that for attempted rape being
less severe than that for rape in the first degree, yet the settled practice of the
criminal law is for the court to pass judgment on the count charging the
highest grade of offense."
DISORDERLY CONDUCT.
People v. Lukowsky, 159 N. Y. Supp. 599. Insulting remarks.
No remark however insulting, addressed by an arrested person to the
police officer making the arrest (there being no evidence that the remark was
made in a loud voice or public manner), can be deemed disorderly conduct tend-
ing to, or intended to provoke a breach of the peace. "The law does not
contemplate that the officer would assault a person in his custody by reason
of a remark addressed to him, yet in no other way could the remark tend to
provoke a breach of the peace."
PAROLE BOARD ACT.
People v. Dean, 159 N. Y. Supp. 601.
(1) Constitutionality,-Laws 1915, C. 579, Sect. 4, providing in case of
conviction of soliciting on the streets or public places for purpose of prostitu-
tion, where defendant has been convicted two or more times during the 24
months just previous, or three or more times previous to that conviction, that the
court shall commit the offender for an indeterminate period not exceeding 2
years, is constitutional, notwithstanding the absence of an express provision
for notice to the defendant of trial as a second offender.
(2) Proof of the prior offenses. "The trial of the issue of a prior con-
viction may be had either in conjunction with the trial on the pending charge
or in a separate proceeding, following the conviction of the defendant.
(3) Due process of law. The constitutional provision as to due process
of law requires in any event that the defendant be duly notifed of the trial
of the issue of former convictions and be given an opportunity to litigate the
issue raised thereby.
In this case the defendant was not notified of the issue of former con-
victions and hence was convicted without due process of law, but the error
can be corrected by modifying the sentence imposed.
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JURISDICTION.
People v. Hayman, 159 N. Y. Supp. 981.
The charter of the city of Rochester restricts the jurisdiction of the
Police court to the trial of misdemeanors. The Penal Law of New York
(Consol. Laws C. 40, Sect. 2) declares that a felony is a ciime which is and
may be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison and any other
crime is a .misdemeanor. Held, that the grade of the offense is determined
by the kind and extent of the punishment which may be inflicted, and not by
the actual sentence.
EVIDENCE.
People v. Smith, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1073. Related transactions.
The defendant was- convicted of the larceny of certain securities. The
evidence showed -that the accused, in the confidence of a rich woman 80 years
old, retained possession of securities belonging to her after her death, and,
upon action being brought by the executor to recover them, fled from the
country. Admissions and untruthful statements were also proved. Held, (1)
Evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilty. (2) Testimony of
transactions -relating to. other securities was not so unrelated to the trans-
action in question as to be incompetent.
People v. Todoro, 160 N: Y. Supp. 352. Rape. Other acts.
In a prosecution for statutory rape, evidence of the accused's previous
improper relations with the complaining witness is admissible for the purpose
of corroboration.
JURISDICTION.
People v. Zimmer, 160 N. Y. Supp. 459. Receiving stolen goods-Place of
trial-County offense.
The code of Cr. Proc. Sect. 134, providing that if a crime is committed
in part in different counties, or the -acts or effects occur in two or more
counties, jurisdiction to try the offense is in either, does not justify the trial
of a person in county A for knowingly receiving stolen goods in county B,
merely because the goods were stolen in county A. Such offense is complete
where the goods are knowingly received. The theft is not strictly an element
of the defendant's crime but only a prerequisite which must be connected with
the defendant by scienter.
ARREST.
Prople v. Ostrosky, 160 N. Y. Supp. 493. Effect of illegal arrest.
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is required when such de-
fendant is arraigned upon a proper information, notwithstanding his arrest was
illegal.
FoRmER JEOPARDY.
Griffith v. State, 112 N. E. 1017 (Ohio).
Where it apeared that the state has procured the conviction of defendant
for the embezzlement of money, he cannot be found guilty on a second indictment
of obtaining the same or part of the same money by false pretenses.
HoMicinE.
People v. Galbo, 112 N. E. 1041 (N. Y.)
(1) Credibility of witnesses. In a prosecution for murder, the finding of
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the jury as to the credibility of witnesses is conclusive and will not be reviewed
except where the penalty is death.
(2) Possession of body. The inference of guilt from the possession of
the body of a murdered person is one of fact; not of law. The inference of
guilt to be drawn alone from the possession of the body must be niost favor-
able, to the defendant, and cannot be used to convict him of a higher crime
than accessory after the fact.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
Town of Cortland v. Larson, 113 N. E. 51 (Ill). Police Powers.
Under charter power to "regulate, prohibit and license the selling of
intoxicating liquors," a town cannot enact an ordinance prohibiting club
members from receiving and keeping intoxicating liquors for their individual
use in clubhouse lockers. The ordinance was not within the town's police
power, for the orderly reception, keeping and use of intoxicating- liquors by
private individuals does not affect the public welfare or health; nor can such
a clubhouse locker system be declared a nuisance.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
People v. O'Brien, 113 N. E. 34 (IIl.). Title of Act.
Laws 1915, p. 374, enacted to amend "An Act to revise the law in relation
to criminal jurisprudence" by adding an additional section known as section
57al and relating to inmates of houses of ill fame and solicitation to prostitu-
tion does not violate Const. Art. 4, Sec. 13, requiring the subject of the act
to be expressed in its title; as it is not necessary that the title shall specifically
and exactly express the subjects of the act or be an index of its details, but
is sufficient if all the provisions of the act relate to one subject indicated
in the title and are parts of it, incidental to it or reasonably connected with it.
FRAUDULENT USE OF MAILS.
Moffatt v. U. S., 232 Fed. 522. Elements of offense. •
Criminal Code, Sec. 215, making it an offense to use the mails to promote
a scheme to defraud, is not confined to cases where false representations are
made as to existing facts, but includes as well schemes to defraud by means
of representations and promises as to the future.
This case was based on methods used in selling the stock of an oil company.
Opinion of the Attorney-General Relative to Licenses for Private
Hospitals.-The Massachusetts State Board of Insanity requested the opin-
ion of the Attorney-General as to whether a physician with a license to conduct
a private hospital in one town foifthe care and treatment of the insane, epileptic,
feeble-minded, and persons addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or
stimulants, could establish a branch of said hospital in another town under the
same license. The opinion of the Attorney-General is herewith presented:
You request my opinion as to whether the present license can be considered
to cover the branch which it is desired to establish some 12 miles away, pro-
vided your Board assents.
St. 1914, c. 762, sect. 7, provides:
The Board shall have power to license private houses and hospitals for the
care and treatment of the insane, epileptics, feeble-minded and persons addicted
to the intemperate use of narcotics and stimulants, and may at any time revoke
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such a license. No such license shall be granted unless the Board is satisfied
that the person applying therefor is a duly qualified physician, as provided in
section thirty-two of chapter five hundred and four of the acts of the year
nineteen hundred and nine, and has had practical experience, in the care and
treatment of such patients. Any person owning or maintaining such a 'hospital
or private house on the sixteenth day of June in the year nineteen hundred and
nine shall be entitled to maintain the same under the provisions of law in force
at that time, except that every such hospital or house shall be subject to the
visitation and supervision of the Board, its officers and agents. Any license
granted heretofore under the provisions of section twenty-four of said chapter
five hundred and four shall be valid, subject to revocation by the Board.
Licenses hereafter granted shall expire with the last day of the calendar year
in which they are issued, but may be renewed. The Board shall have power
to fix reasonable fees for the said licenses and for renewals thereof. Whoever
establishes" or keeps such a hospital or private house without a license, unless
otherwise authorized by law, shall forfeit a sum not exceeding five hundred
dollars.
For several years, in enacting new statutes with reference to this subject,
it has been the policy of the Legislature to permit institutions already lawfully in
existence to continue to operate. The permission now in effect and quoted
above is "to maintain the same." It would seem to need no citation or dic-
tionary definition to determine that the opening of a new place 12 miles distant
from a sanatorium already licensed goes much beyond the mere maintaining
of the existing institution.
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the license previously issued cannot
be considered to cover this new enterprise, and that a new license therefor is
necessary before it can be lawfully established and kept.
